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# The curious case of Polish net export limits
- URL: https://121gigawatts.org/the-curious-case-of-polish-net-export-limits/
- Published: 2026-11-19T23:10:44.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-20T16:50:10.000Z
- Description: Figuring out why Poland is setting net export limits despite having sufficient reserves 🤔
- Author: Zoltán Marić

While [developing Critical Elements](https://121gigawatts.org/critical-elements/) ⚡️, a tool that shows what causes day-ahead energy prices to split between countries, it struck me very early that the Polish border was lighting up purple very often. As in – multiple times a day. Here's one example from today:  

Whenever the Polish border lights up purple on this map, it means that Poland had set a net export limit, and that that limit was also binding in this interval. In other words – the limit was hit and it contributed to prices splitting between Poland and its neighbours. In the case above, the limit specifically says

> All exports from Poland – all imports into Poland ≤ 0 MW

In other words – net-importing energy is allowed, net-exporting is not. Net-exports will only happen when Poland offers cheaper energy than its neighbours, so in effect, this limit allows cheap energy in, but disallows letting cheap energy out.

💡

Importantly, `cheap energy in -> OK`, `cheap energy out -> not OK` is an ***effect** of this limit, but it is not the ***purpose** of this limit.

So I turned to LinkedIn to learn about the actual purpose of having this limit. To my delight, it sparked quite a debate:

From this debate, I've learned that the stated reason for having the limit is that Poland is struggling to secure sufficient reserve capacity. In other words, the Polish transmission system operator PSE is worried that without the limit, the additional demand from abroad will cause Polish generators to commit all (or too much) of their capacity for delivering energy, and not leave enough power available to balance the system.

# Things have changed

[A report published by ACER](https://www.acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Publications/ACER-Monitoring-Report-electricity-market-integration-2026.pdf?ref=121gigawatts.org#page=60:~:text=This%20limitation%20is%20required,prior%20to%20the%20day%2Dahead%20market.) 2 weeks ago (Nov 4 2026) claimed that

> PSE needs to set allocation constraints because they don't have a reserve market ahead of the day-ahead auction.

This used to be true, but there is a reserve market since June 2024\. In fact, since August 14 2026, PSE publishes how much reserve capacity it will need and how much it managed to purchase, ahead of the day-ahead auction.

So I thought to myself:

👾

This is it! If I just look at all the times when the Polish net export limit is binding, I will surely see that the reserve capacity they bought was less than what they needed!

Well, I didn't exactly expect to see that in every case, but I did expect to see it in at least most of the cases.

![A man stares blankly](https://121gigawatts.org/content/images/2026/11/nope.gif) 

# Nope.

What I hoped would be "at least most of the cases" turned out to be **8.3%** of the cases.

Let me explain what the above chart shows. PSE started publishing their reserves on August 14th 2026\. Today is November 19th 2026, so we have 98 days of data. There are 9412 quarter-hours (15-minute intervals) in 98 days. Of those 9412 quarter hours, the net ***export*** limit from Poland was binding in 2413 intervals.

> More than 25% of the time.

To be fair, we can also see that there were 542 intervals where the ***import*** limit was binding. That case actually makes Poland "self-inflict" higher prices than its neighbours, but we also see that ***import*** limits bind almost 5 times less often than ***export*** limits. All of that is what the top bar shows. 

The bottom bar zooms in on the export limits. Of the 2413 intervals where the ***export*** limit was binding, only 201 intervals show a shortage in procured reserve capacity. Only 8.3% of the time.

😗

In over 90% of the cases where the Polish net export cap was binding, there were no shortages in procured reserve capacity.

To really drive this home, here's a full list of intervals where the export cap was binding along with the required and procured reserves. Clicking on a row shows that interval on the map.

# So why the frequent caps then?

To be fair, the [official ACER methodology](https://www.sepsas.sk/engine/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/ACER-Decision-10-2026-on-Fourth-amendment-of-the-Core-DA-CCM-Annex-II.pdf?ref=121gigawatts.org#page=54:~:text=This%20leads%20to%20implementation%20of%20allocation%20constraints,of%20oversupply%29.) that describes this process states that insufficient reserves are not the only justification for setting a cap: 

> This leads to implementation of allocation constraints, being the necessary means to ensure operational security of Polish power system in terms of securing generating capacities for upward or downward regulation, as well as **in order to cover the national imbalances** in the direction of **shortage** (i.e. cover the residual demand) and **surplus** (i.e. manage and regulate down the surplus of power during periods of oversupply).

Apparently, Poland is struggling with large imbalance volumes – meaning that at the time of delivery, energy market participants don't "stick to the plan" and they use more power than what they bought. At that point it's up to the TSO (PSE) to cover the missing energy by dispatching additional generators.

It's not clear to me why this problem doesn't fix itself with high imbalance prices, but I'll leave that to a follow-up discussion.

# Shouldn't the TSO have to explain why it's doing this?

It turns out that they should! [Article 7.3 of the same methodology document](https://www.sepsas.sk/engine/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/ACER-Decision-10-2026-on-Fourth-amendment-of-the-Core-DA-CCM-Annex-II.pdf?ref=121gigawatts.org#page=14:~:text=in%20case%20the%20allocation%20constraint%20had%20a%20non%2Dzero%20shadow%20price,alternative%20solutions%20to%20address%20the%20underlying%20operational%20security%20limits.) from above states:

> in case the allocation constraint had a non-zero shadow price in more than 0.1% of hours in a quarter, provide to the CCC a report analysing: (i) for each MTU when the allocation constraint had a non-zero shadow price the loss in economic surplus due to allocation constraint and the effectiveness of the allocation constraint in preventing the violation of the underlying operational security limits and (ii) alternative solutions to address the underlying operational security limits.

So PSE is expected to show how much imposing the caps cost, how well they worked, and what's a better way.

As shown above, the caps were set much more frequently than 0.1% of hours of both Q3 and Q4 this year. The [JAO Q1 2026](https://www.jao.eu/quarterly-reports?ref=121gigawatts.org) report contains the reports for Q2-Q42025, but I couldn't find any reports for 2026, even though 3 were already due – one for each of the first 3 quarters of this year 🤷

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I'll be looking forward to your comments and insights on [this LinkedIn comment thread](https://lnkd.in/p/dRBBzNTz?ref=121gigawatts.org) 🙌.